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When David Hoﬀman taught law at the University of Maryland in the
1820s, he devoted his ﬁrst few classes to the topic he thought would be most
practical for future lawyers—“the fundamental principles of Morals and of
Natural Law.” Students needed to learn natural law, he explained, because
as lawyers they would ﬁnd in court opinions “perpetual references to the
elementary principles of that science.”1 Hoﬀman’s students would eventually
get a tour of the American legal landscape in all its technical splendor, but that
was no way to start, he believed, because the law “is not a system of merely
positive and arbitrary rules. It has its deep foundations in the universal laws
of our moral nature, and, all its positive enactments, proceeding on these,
must receive their just interpretation with a reference to them.” How could
one interpret a statute or a contract “without knowledge of the general
principles on which they are promulgated or entered into?” Why were statutes
presumed not to apply retroactively, if not because of “the principle of natural
law, or ethicks, that associations are bound only by rules to which they have
consented?” What were the rules of evidence “but metaphysical and ethical
modes of investigating truth on the one hand, and limiting our deductions
by a regard to human rights and feelings, and to our moral constitution, on
the other?” In all these respects and many more, Hoﬀman declared, a lawyer
could scarcely practice “without knowledge of the true principles of moral and
political philosophy.”2 Hoﬀman aimed to make his students “practice-ready,”
as we might put it today. Practicing lawyers used natural law, so law students
needed to learn it.
Today, of course, few law schools, if any, begin with natural law. Most
students probably graduate without encountering it at all. If students do
learn about natural law, it is likely to be in an elective course not advertised
as useful for practicing lawyers, such as a course in the philosophy of law or
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the history of legal thought. The reason is not hard to ﬁnd. Natural law is no
longer part of the lawyer’s toolkit. If a lawyer were to say, “Your Honor, before
I discuss the applicable statutes and precedent, I will begin with the law of
nature,” the judge would have a puzzled look, and opposing counsel would
start planning the victory party. When lawyers stopped using natural law, law
schools stopped teaching it.
But was David Hoﬀman right? What role did natural law actually play
in law practice? And was he typical? How did natural law feature in legal
education? These are the questions Richard Helmholz sets out to answer
in Natural Law in Court, not just for the early United States but also for early
modern England and continental Europe. As Helmholz points out, no one
has ever seriously tried to answer these questions. While philosophers and
historians of philosophy have written a lot about natural law, little has been
written about natural law as a topic in the history of legal practice or legal
education.3 American lawyers today may know a few prominent examples of
the use of natural law in early American legal documents. The Declaration of
Independence says that humans “are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights.” The 1798 Supreme Court case Calder v. Bull4 includes a
well-known exchange between Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell
regarding the role of natural law in interpreting statutes. But that tells us little
about ordinary law practice. How often did lawyers use natural law? How
much did students learn about it?
Natural Law in Court answers these questions. The ﬁrst third of the book
covers continental Europe between roughly 1500 and 1800, the middle third
covers England during the same period, and the ﬁnal third covers the United
States between the Revolution and the Civil War. Helmholz is one of very few
people who could have written all three parts. Each of these three sections is
divided into two chapters, one on legal education and the other on litigation.
The chapters on legal education rely on treatises and books written speciﬁcally
for students, while the chapters on litigation focus on published court cases.
Each chapter rests on an enormous amount of learning, presented very lightly.
While discussing the English treatise literature, for example, Helmholz tosses
oﬀ a paragraph (pp. 91-92) that cites 85 diﬀerent authors. A similar paragraph
(pp. 139-140) on the American treatises cites 62.
Helmholz shows that in all three contexts natural law was discussed fairly
often, both in litigation and in materials intended for students. There is
no way to know exactly how often. Published records of litigation and legal
instruction represent an unknowable and varying percentage, and probably a
very small percentage, of the total amount of litigation and legal instruction
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that took place. But Helmholz is able to demonstrate that natural law appeared
regularly, for centuries, in litigation and in legal education. He presents enough
evidence to be able to reject sweeping statements in either direction, either
that natural law was ubiquitous or that it was absent. The truth is somewhere
in between. Natural law was part of the lawyer’s toolkit—not the only part, but
part nonetheless. David Hoﬀman was right, and he was typical.
Much of Natural Law in Court is taken up with a description of the settings
in which natural law was frequently invoked. Helmholz ﬁnds that natural
law often ﬁgured in procedural matters, such as whether a defendant had
received adequate notice of the charge against him. Natural law arose in cases
involving marriage and inheritance. It was invoked when individuals alleged
that government oﬃcials had abused their power, although this role became
less important in the United States, where a written constitution took over
from natural law as the main vehicle for challenging government power.
The most interesting of these settings from the perspective of a present-day
American lawyer is the use of natural law in statutory interpretation, another
practice Helmholz shows was common in Europe, England, and the United
States. He explains that natural law was not used to “strike down” legislation
in the modern sense of judicial review, but rather to interpret legislation.
For example, in a case decided by Lord Mansﬁeld in 1771, the King’s Bench
interpreted a 13th-century statute providing that goods washed up on shore
after a shipwreck belong to the Crown, unless a man, a dog, or a cat survived
the shipwreck (pp. 114-15). In this case, no one survived the shipwreck, not even
any of the dogs or cats, but the goods washed up on shore. They consisted
of several barrels of tallow that clearly belonged to the plaintiﬀ—he had sent
them on the boat and was trying to recover them. The language of the statute
pointed against the plaintiﬀ, but Mansﬁeld determined that awarding the
tallow to the Crown would be contrary to natural law. He accordingly looked
to the purpose of the statute, which he concluded was to ensure that goods
were returned to their true owner. If a survivor of the shipwreck could identify
the owner of the goods, or if a surviving dog or cat was seen to recognize the
owner, a court could be conﬁdent that a claimant was the true owner. When
the statute was interpreted in the light of natural law, it was not an arbitrary
rule speciﬁcally about dogs and cats, but rather an injunction to award
shipwrecked goods to claimants only if there was no doubt about the goods’
ownership. Mansﬁeld accordingly awarded the tallow to the plaintiﬀ.
The reason such examples are so interesting is that one can readily imagine
an American judge reaching the same conclusion today by invoking one of
the standard canons of statutory interpretation, without the use, or at least
without the explicit use, of natural law. The argument would go: (1) statutes are
interpreted so as to avoid reaching absurd results, because we assume that the
legislature is composed of rational people trying to pursue sensible goals; (2)
it would be absurd to award the tallow to the Crown when we know for certain
whose tallow it is; (3) the legislature intended the business about dogs and cats
to help resolve cases of uncertainty, not cases like this, in which the legislature
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would have wanted to return the tallow to its true owner; and therefore (4)
the plaintiﬀ wins. Indeed, a modern lawyer who is accustomed to this sort
of reasoning but unaccustomed to natural law could easily miss Mansﬁeld’s
invocation of natural law, because otherwise Mansﬁeld’s reasoning seems so
familiar.
We can make the same comparison the other way around as well, by looking
for modern examples of statutory interpretation with reference to canons of
construction, and then considering how these cases would have been handled
in an era when lawyers spoke in terms of natural law. For instance, in a recent
case called Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a statute that
made it a crime to transmit a threat to injure another person. The defendant
argued that despite the menacing tone of his words, he had not intended
to threaten anyone—he was merely an aspiring rap artist who intended his
violent lyrics as art. The statute did not say that the defendant had to intend
his words to be a threat. The statute included no requirement of a mental state
at all. The Court nevertheless concluded that some culpable mental state was
a requirement, based not on the text of the statute but on the background
principle that crimes generally require mental states. To show that this truly
was a background principle undergirding the criminal law, the Court cited
several of its prior opinions applying the principle.5 Such citations make
perfect sense today, when there is no source of law outside of written texts,
and when one can believe that somewhere in Congress there are lawyers who
draft the precise words of statutes and who are aware that their words will be
interpreted in light of this background principle.6
How would this case have been decided in the 18th century? A judge could
easily have reached the same conclusion, but rather than locating the source
of the background principle in the court’s own prior opinions, the judge could
have identiﬁed the requirement of a mental state as a principle of natural
law. This natural principle, that conduct is criminal only when the defendant
has a blameworthy mind, would not have been invoked to strike down the
statute but rather to interpret it, in accordance with the presumed desire of the
legislature to accomplish a just result.
Of course, the presumption of a mental state is hardly the only canon of
statutory construction courts use today. But where do these principles come
from? Today we say that they come from court opinions, and that courts are
justiﬁed in applying them because they are so widely known that they form a
backdrop against which legislatures write. A couple of centuries ago, lawyers
might have said that they are principles of natural law that properly guide our
interpretation of statutes because legislators are striving to accomplish just
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ends. In a legal culture that included natural law, the outcomes of cases might
well have been the same, but the path of reasoning toward those outcomes
would have been quite diﬀerent.
Natural Law in Court is full of down-to-earth examples like the case of the
shipwrecked tallow, examples that should cause present-day lawyers to start
thinking about other modern substitutes for tasks that were once handled
by natural law. For example, court opinions today often include what are
sometimes called “policy arguments,” which tend to be appeals to normative
principles that are presumably uncontroversial among legal professionals. The
common law governing found property, for example, is sometimes justiﬁed
with reference to the policy goal of returning property to its true owner. That
goal is typically not itself found in legislation; rather, it is assumed to be one
that everyone wants to advance. In an earlier era, it might have been posited
as a principle of natural law.
Helmholz set out to assess the importance of natural law in law practice and
legal education between the 16th and 19th centuries. In that respect, Natural Law
in Court is a smashing success. But the book also achieves an equally important
goal that Helmholz may not have pursued: It makes the concept of natural
law understandable to the modern lawyer. Today, the idea of using natural law
in court seems at ﬁrst quite foreign and even backward, a practice that smacks
of superstition, like witch trials or trial by ordeal. But the lawyers and judges
who appear in Natural Law in Court are not like that at all. They are people quite
like us, making arguments with a diﬀerent vocabulary than ours but otherwise
very similar. On Helmholz’s telling, natural law becomes much less strange.
Sometime in the 19th century natural law began a slow decline, until it
virtually dropped out of our courts and thus our law schools. Part of the reason
must have something to do with the simultaneous separation of religion from
public political life. Americans may not have become any less religious, but
religion gradually came to be redeﬁned as a private, personal realm, separate
from institutions of government. But this is unlikely to be the whole answer,
because natural law was not entirely a religious phenomenon. Natural laws
are found in nature but they need not be created by a God. Today we still
speak of scientiﬁc laws as natural laws. In the social domain we speak of the
laws of supply and demand, the law of diminishing returns, and the like. Any
recurring and non-humanly created pattern of experience could be described
as a principle of natural law—the proposition that children tend to be more
energetic than adults, for example, or that absolute power corrupts. Human
beings are parts of nature. The other parts of nature, even other kinds of
animals, are governed by natural laws. “There is nothing in nature which
has not its laws,” Henry St. George Tucker lectured the law students at the
University of Virginia in the 1840s. “If there be a law for all other created
things, why not for man!”7 One can easily imagine an alternative legal history in
which a non-religious natural law persisted, losing its Christian grounding
but acquiring a scientiﬁc or social-scientiﬁc grounding instead. But that is not
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what happened, at least not in the explicit vocabulary of the legal system.
Instead we gradually adopted a new style of argument in which natural law no
longer counted as authority.
Helmholz concludes Natural Law in Court by suggesting natural law’s
limitations. “It did not abolish slavery,” he notes. “It did not end judicial
torture. It did not require payment of a ‘living wage.’ It did not prevent the
oppression of native peoples in the Americas. It did not prevent what by our
lights seem to have been serious miscarriages of justice” (pp. 177-178). As he
points out, these limitations would not have come as any surprise to the lawyers
he discusses, who would not have entertained any such hopes. The principles
of natural law that could be put to practical use in litigation were but a small
subset of the moral principles to which people aspired in their everyday lives.
“Human laws are imperfect in this respect,” acknowledged the lawyer-poet
Francis Scott Key. “The sphere of morality is more extensive than the limits
of civil jurisdiction.”8 Natural law was fundamental, in the sense that it was
believed to undergird the legal system, but natural law was also modest in its
actual application. Natural Law in Court amply demonstrates both propositions.
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